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 At this stage, while campaigning is unofficial, the media
should be exposing the inefficiency of what's going on,
instead of covering it as if it were serious or warranted.
By Adhemar Altieri
Current newspaper headlines and magazine covers would have an unknowing observer
believing the next presidential election is around the corner in Brazil. In fact, the next
general elections happen in October of 2002, thirteen months down the road. This harmful,
unwarranted early start to campaigning has been a trait of Brazilian politics since the
end of the military regime in 1985—some say, not entirely in jest, that it's more
like a continuous process, with the next campaign beginning the moment an election
ends…
The fact is that such an early kick-off to campaigning is harmful on several fronts. So
much precocious activity involving who should and shouldn't run, which parties will join
which fronts or coalitions, who's up and who's down in the latest surveys, also gets
discussions started way down the line: who will get cabinet positions and other plum
government posts, and where will government funds be directed for example. And of course,
the government can't just allow opponents to "decide" where the future lies, and
jumps into the fray. All of which makes campaigning and not governing the priority.
Nobody wants to be so naïve as to believe that strictly political considerations are
not a part of governing elsewhere in the world. Perhaps Brazil's fault is that early
electioneering is done so openly and intensely, as opposed to the more controlled routines
observed in countries where democracy and institutions are more deep-rooted. So it's not
as if no horse—trading happens long before elections take place elsewhere. It's just
that in Brazil, the bartering reaches a high level of intensity much more
quickly—possibly a result of nearly three decades (1961 to 1989) without free and
open political activity, and a lingering, albeit unwarranted fear, that things might one
day revert to that.
Although democracy was only fully re-instated in Brazil in 1985, there have been enough
elections since for voters, politicians and the media to notice that certain routines
stemming from this get-going early mentality are not exactly productive. For example, the
idea that someone can win by being first off the gate is obviously misguided: in all
presidential elections since the return of democracy—1989, 1994 and 1998—early
front-runners did not confirm that status on election day. As a direct effect of that, we
now see the left-wing PT, or Worker's Party, not confirming that its candidate will be its
President of Honor, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, or just plain Lula: three times he held
the early lead, and three times he was defeated, so for now, "officially" he is
not the candidate, although everyone in Brazil seems to know better.
Other parties and presidential wannabes are following suit, and not firming up
candidacies or coalitions and alliances, which can get a bit silly: there's hardly a
chance that Lula, former Finance Minister Ciro Gomes, former President and current Minas
Gerais state Governor Itamar Franco, and Rio de Janeiro governor Anthony Garotinho will
not be on the presidential ballot. This means virtually all that's being said this long
before next year's elections is much too "iffy" and can be safely discarded:
real speeches and proposals are being saved for later in the ball game.
The news media insists on "play-by-play" coverage of these early moves,
offering heaps of prominent space about who might do what and who says what about whom.
Instead, it should be coming down hard on politicians who benefit from a system that makes
it very difficult for an elected official to be penalized by voters for concentrating on
early campaigning, while basically abandoning the chores one is elected to carry out. A
lack of district voting, mandatory voting, election laws that prevent proper news coverage
of election campaigns by the broadcast media (print outlets are not affected), and free
radio and TV airtime for politicians to campaign unopposed and uncriticized, all
contribute to protect politicians from being chastised in any way. At this stage, while
campaigning is unofficial, the media should be exposing the inefficiency of what's going
on, instead of covering it as if it were serious or warranted.
From the government's perspective, it all becomes a battle to avoid early "lame
duck" status. Allowing the opposition to monopolize the discussion would deliver that
message, so the government is forced to add an election ingredient to what it does on a
daily basis. The past week, for example, saw Finance Minister Pedro Malan speak directly
to the opposition during the announcement of a R$12.5 billion (about US$5.5 billion) aid
package for federal banks. He said the announcement was "proof" the government
was going about its business normally, and would remain "active" until the end
of its term of office—as if that were in question. The government is also playing the
game by not firming up its standard-bearer in 2002—Health Minister José Serra and
Ceará state Governor Tasso Jereissati, appear to have the inside track, with Education
Minister Paulo Renato de Souza and Finance Minister Pedro Malan appearing as longshots.
In two specific ways, the government—and President Cardoso himself—have
actually fuelled the early campaigning for 2002. The government contribution is the
ongoing energy crisis, which opponents see as an impossible negative point for the
government to overcome, no matter how much money and effort it pours into its candidate's
campaign. The lack of rain argument simply isn't sticking, and the government is being
widely blamed for mismanaging the situation, and allowing it to reach crisis proportions.
Brasília apparently believes the crisis will be overcome in early 2002, and actually
become a positive point in its campaign.
As for President Cardoso, he helped the early campaign kick-off by appearing to be
vulnerable. In periods when democracy has been in place in Brazil, it has been something
of a tradition for a president to, as they say here, "make his successor". In
other words, the candidate supported by the incumbent wins the election. Cardoso's chances
of accomplishing this were already seen as dubious because of numerous corruption charges
involving government members and allies over the past few months. The problem was
compounded by the way the government moved last month to "convince" 20 members
of Congress to withdraw their names from a request for a parliamentary inquiry into
corruption. The energy crisis added what many in the opposition saw as a key ingredient to
an insurmountable set of negatives, which Cardoso, in their view, certainly could not
overcome.
So firm is the belief that an opposition candidate will win in 2002 that the PT went so
far as to announce a proposal for an economic plan, which turns away from many of its more
radical positions—like defaulting on Brazil's foreign debt, and re-possessing
privatized former state companies. What many are describing as a "light" version
of the PT platform is a move designed to address mainly outside concerns. As the political
battle has been gathering steam in Brazil, foreign investors have been wondering whether
Brazil will remain an option once Cardoso leaves power.
Demagoguery and populism notwithstanding, the PT is fully aware of the importance of
foreign investments, which must continue to flow into Brazil in the future if development
is to be maintained. So it wants to present itself as a serious option, not one intent on
scaring away investors—although most observers and even party insiders have a hard
time believing much of what is in the "light" platform would be acceptable to
the party's more extreme factions.
While parties and their leaders behave as if election day is just ahead, once again
Brazilian society seems to be ahead of its elected officials in the democratic development
process. Surveys clearly show that, when unprompted (no candidate names suggested), voters
are simply not in election mode: most don't name a favorite candidate, and some—4
percent according to a survey concluded last month—actually name President Fernando
Henrique Cardoso, who cannot run in 2002 because he is on a second consecutive term.
Political reform, often proposed and always ignored in Brazil, would begin to address
the situation. A system with more checks on political activity would force those elected
to keep working, and not allow campaigning to take over so early. Cardoso twice promised
to make it a priority, in 1994 and 1998, only to find that nobody in the political arena,
partisan or opponent, really wants to deal with it. Since reform depends on those who now
inhabit the system, and they seem quite happy with the way things are, the wisest advice
would seem to be "don't hold your breath". Maybe next time, depending on who
wins in 2002. Maybe. And that's a definite maybe.
Adhemar Altieri is a veteran with major news outlets in Brazil, Canada
and the United States. He holds a Master's Degree in Journalism from Northwestern
University in Evanston, Illinois, and spent ten years with CBS News reporting from Canada
and Brazil. Altieri is a member of the Virtual Intelligence Community, formed by The
Greenfield Consulting Group to identify future trends for Latin America. He is also the
editor of InfoBrazil (http://www.infobrazil.com),
an English-language weekly e-zine with analysis and opinions on Brazilian politics and
economy. You can reach the author at editors@infobrazil.com
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